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Oh, by the way, the Indiana Supreme Court decided to toss out the common-law right to resist unlawful police entry of a person’s home. The majority ruled resisting unlawful police entry into a house was against public policy and incompatible with modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. How did this come about?

Robert Barnes was arguing with his wife Mary while he was moving out of their apartment. Mary tried calling her sister, but Robert threw the phone against the wall. Mary then used her cell phone to call 911. She told the police her husband was throwing things around but he had not struck her.

The police arrived, identified Robert Barnes in the parking lot and began questioning him. Robert raised his voice telling the police they were not needed, he was getting his things and leaving. He continued talking loudly when his wife came into the parking lot and threw a duffle bag in his direction. She told him to get the rest of his stuff and then returned to the apartment.

Mary went into the apartment followed by Robert. He blocked the doorway telling the police they couldn’t enter. Mary did not invite the police in but she told Robert, “Just let them in”. One of the officers attempted to enter and Robert shoved him against the wall. Struggling, the officers used a choke hold and a taser and arrested Robert. Robert was taken to the hospital. He was charged with a bunch of misdemeanors including resisting law enforcement and interference with the reporting of a crime.

Robert appealed his conviction based on the court’s refusal to instruct the jury on a citizen’s right to reasonably resist unlawful entry into the citizen’s home.

From this point on it goes beyond Robert and Mary. The Indiana Supreme Court decided—-without caring about the particulars of this domestic incident—no one in the state has a common-law right to resist illegal police entry.

Richard L. Barnes v State of Indiana

Now this Court is faced for the first time with the question of whether Indiana should recognize the common-law right to reasonably resist unlawful entry by police officers. We conclude that public policy disfavors any such right. Accordingly, the trial court‘s refusal to give Barnes‘s tendered instruction was not error.

The English common-law right to resist unlawful police action existed for over three hundred years, and some scholars trace its origin to the Magna Carta in 1215. The courts have been whittling away at it over recent years.

In the 1920s, legal scholarship began criticizing the right as valuing individual liberty over physical security of the officers…One scholar noted that the common-law right came from a time where ?resistance to an arrest by a peace officer did not involve the serious dangers it does today.

The Indiana Supreme Court cited another ruling where the common law right was acknowledged…

The Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Casselman v. State….When the sheriff‘s deputy went to his home to effect a civil arrest, the defendant attempted to close the door in the deputy‘s face. A brief struggle ensued, and the defendant was arrested when he retreated into his house. The Court of Appeals found that the deputy ?was not lawfully engaged in the execution of civil process when he prevented the defendant from closing the door to his home. … Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged the trend of abolishing the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest, it ultimately focused on the heightened expectation of privacy in one‘s home and recognized a right to resist an unlawful entry into a home by a police officer.

…but they weren’t moved by arguments about expectation of privacy.

Here, the trial court‘s failure to give the proffered jury instruction was not error. Because we decline to recognize the right to reasonably resist an unlawful police entry, we need not decide the legality of the officers‘ entry into Barnes‘s apartment. We note, however, that the officers were investigating a domestic violence in progress in response to a 911 call. A 911 call generally details emergency or exigent circumstances requiring swift police action. In these cases, the officers are responding to rapidly changing or escalating events, and their initial response is often based on limited information. The officers cannot properly assess the complaint and the dangers to those threatened without some limited access to the involved parties. It is unrealistic to expect officers to wait for threats to escalate and for violence to become imminent before intervening. Here, the officers acted reasonably under the totality of the circumstances.

At least the court felt the need to find some kind of justification even though they don’t think it matters. What next? Naked machines and pat downs at your front door?